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Abstract: We analyze the aid portfolio of various bilateral and multilateral donors,
testing whether they have prioritized aid in line with the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Employing Tobit models that combine sectorally disaggregated aid
data with various indicators reﬂecting the situation of recipient countries regard-
ing the MDGs, we show that donors differ in the extent to which their sectoral
aid allocation is conducive to achieving major MDGs. Some MDGs, notably the
ﬁght against HIV/AIDS, have shaped the allocation of aid. However, with respect
to other MDGs such as primary education, there is a considerable gap between
donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation. This invites the conclusion that the cur-
rent focus on substantially increasing aid is unlikely to have the desired effects un-
less the targeting of aid is improved. JEL no. F35, O11, O19
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1 Introduction
Various developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa, are highly
likely to miss the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNDP
2005a: 9). This does not only apply to the ﬁrst and most prominent target,
which requires halving the incidence of absolute poverty (the proportion
of people living on less than one dollar a day) by the year 2015. Even
though more speciﬁc MDGs have received less attention in public debate,
the prospects for achieving education and health-related targets are still
worse (Berg and Qureshi 2005: 21). Easterly (2005)lists “a litany of failure”
by referring to the report on the MDGs presented by the Secretary General
of the United Nations to the UN World Summit in September 2005 (UN
2005).
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Toturnthetide,recentreportspublishedbytheUNMillenniumProject,
directed by Jeffrey Sachs (UNDP 2005a), and the Commission for Africa
(CFA), set up by Prime Minister Tony Blair (CFA 2005),have issued urgent
calls to increase ofﬁcial development aid substantially and, thereby, close
the gap between donor rhetoric and reality. Accordingly, donorsare mainly
compared with regard to their “generosity” in granting aid. Japan and
the United States are widely blamed for falling grossly short of the UN
target of 0.7 percent of gross national income to be devoted to aid, whereas
the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries exceeded this target in 2004
(OECD 2006).
In addition to the quantity of aid, qualitative aspects of aid allocation
are increasingly recognized to be important for effectively meeting recip-
ient needs. Several studies made the point that aid effectiveness could be
improvedif aid wasbetter targeted to poor recipient countries with reason-
ablygood local conditions, e.g., interms ofbasic institutions andeconomic
policies, that allow aid to be absorbed productively (Burnside and Dollar
2000; Collier and Dollar 2002).1
Moststudiesthatcomparetheallocationofaidacrossdonorscometothe
conclusion that donor performance varies widely. According to Dollar and
Levin (2006),some donors(InternationalDevelopmentAssociation (IDA),
Denmark,theUnitedKingdom,Norway,theNetherlands,andSweden)take
both theprevalenceofpovertyandthequalityofinstitutions andeconomic
policy into account, whereas France and the United States do not.2 For the
United States and Japan, geopolitical and commercial interests seem to be
the most important determinants of aid, respectively (Alesina and Dollar
2000).3 Berthélemy (2006) ﬁnds that “all donors are not the same” with
1 However, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) and Hudson and
Mosley (2001) test the robustness of the interaction term between the Burnside-Dollar
policy index and aid, reporting the interaction to be statistically insigniﬁcant in many
cases.
2 Amprou et al. (2007) show that the pattern of donor selectivity changes considerably
once the vulnerability of recipient countries to exogenous shocks and their level of human
capital are considered as additional selectivity criteria.
3 Multilateral institutions seem to generally pay greater attention to recipient needs than
bilateral donors do (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Dollar 2000). Canavire et
al. (2005) ﬁnd no indication that donor countries were able to push through their in-
dividual trade and political interests at the multilateral level. However, various other
studies suggest that multilateral institutions are not invulnerable to donor pressure
(Weck-Hannemann and Schneider 1981; Frey and Schneider 1986; Dreher 2004; Fleck
and Kilby 2006; Kilby 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2006; Dreher and Jensen
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respect to various indicators of recipient need as well as donor interest.
A drawbackof all these studies is, however,that they arebased on aggregate
aidﬁgures.Nonegoesbeyondexcluding emergencysupportfrom“regular”
aid, even though Harms and Lutz (2005: 35) concluded from a survey on
the economic growth effects of aid that “it is not surprising that a variable
as aggregate as ofﬁcial development assistance does not have a robust effect
on growth.”
Onlyfewofthe studies addressing theactual behavior ofdonorstakeup
the issue of aid heterogeneity. A notable example is Roodman (2004), who
provides a detailed account of donor performance by combining quanti-
tative and qualitative measures of aid, including “penalties” for tying aid
and so-called project proliferation as well as a discounting system favoring
aid to poorer and better-governed countries. Yet, his ranking of donors is
dominated by differences in the overall quantity of aid. More speciﬁcally,
Neumayer (2005) assesses the allocation of food aid. His ﬁndings under-
score the need for adisaggregated analysis of aid. The allocation of food aid
differs strikingly from previous results on the allocation of overallaid; food
aid appears to be better targeted at countries in need than other forms of
aid. However,food aid accounted for just about 3 percent of total aid in the
late 1990s.
The sectoral composition of aid, on which we focus in this paper,
has barely received attention in previous efforts to account for aid het-
erogeneity. This is surprising once it is taken into consideration that the
sectoral composition of aid should have an important say on whether or
not donors help achieving MDGs other than the general target of halving
absolute poverty. In this paper, we follow Clemens et al. (2004) in draw-
ing on the sectorally disaggregated data on aid commitments provided
by the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Creditor Re-
porting System. In contrast to the analysis of growth effects by Clemens
et al. (2004), however, we take a broader view and differentiate aid by
the various speciﬁc purposes it is meant to serve according to announce-
ments madeby donors.Donorsstressthemultidimensional objective func-
tion underlying their aid allocation (Isenman and Ehrenpreis 2003).4 In
a similar vein, McGillivray (2003) as well as Amprou et al. (2007) call
for a broader concept of aid selectivity and make a case for extending
4 For instance, Svensson (2005) notes that the Swedish aid agency SIDA lists ﬁve objec-
tives in addition to promoting economic growth in the recipient country: economic and
social equality; economic and political independence; democratic development; environ-
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the selectivity model based on the income and policy situation of recip-
ient countries proposed by Collier and Dollar (2002). While it is widely
acknowledged that aid may reduce poverty through its impact on eco-
nomic growth, “it must also be recognized that aid can reduce poverty
through other channels” (McGillivray 2003: 29). Pro-poor public expen-
ditures, e.g., in the ﬁelds of basic education and basic health, are often
noted in this context.5 The MDGs provide an obvious point of depar-
ture for taking account of a broader range of poverty-relevant objectives
of aid.6
Speciﬁcally, wecomparetheaidportfolioofvariousbilateralandmulti-
lateral donors and investigate whether they have prioritized aid in line with
the MDGs. For example, the MDGs suggest that aid should be targeted at
improving basic education and health conditions in recipient countries. In
Section 2, we examine to what extent donorshavechanneled aid to priority
sectors. Section 3 evaluates whether donors have allocated sector-speciﬁc
aid according to speciﬁc needs of recipient countries. In a Tobit regres-
sion analysis, we combine disaggregated aid data with indicators reﬂecting
the situation of recipient countries with regard to the MDGs. Section 4
summarizes the main conclusions of the paper.
2 The Sectoral Allocation of Aid: Some Stylized Facts
In examining the sectoral composition of aid, we ﬁrst consider all donors
taken together and then look at selected donors individually. These include
the two main multilateral donors (EU and IDA), the ﬁve biggest bilateral
donors (France, Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United King-
dom), and a group of countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden),whicharenotonlygenerousdonorsbutarealsosupposedtotarget
aid carefully according to recipient needs.7 For all aid categories we apply
the grantequivalent, i.e., the product of the nominalamount ofaid andthe
grant element; this variable best reﬂects the effective ﬁnancial support of
5 As another example, Abu-Ghadia and Klasen (2004) calculate substantial costs in terms
of mortality and prevalence of underweight children under ﬁve for 45 countries likely to
miss the target on gender equality.
6 In the words of Isenman and Ehrenpreis (2003: 10), the MDGs “identify multidimen-
sional poverty reduction as the ultimate objective of development efforts.”
7 Neumayer (2003) calls these countries like-minded donors; Kilby (2006) employs these
countries’ aid allocation as a humanitarian benchmark.600 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
donors.8 In addition, we employ commitments, which in a study of aid al-
location are superior to disbursements because they constitute the decision
variable over which donors exert full control (Neumayer 2003).
AsshowninTable1,thesectoral composition ofaidforalldonorstaken
together has changed quite dramatically since the early 1990s. As concerns
the MDGs, the most notable result is that the share of aid devoted to the
social sector rose from about 20 percent in the period 1990–1992 to about
35 percent in the period 2002–2004, with higher spending on education,
health, and population programs, though not on water and sanitation. The
expansion of social sector aid has come at the expense of aid towards more
traditional targets such as infrastructure, but it also reﬂects a move from
program assistance to project ﬁnancing. The latter is somewhat at odds
with donors’ claims to promote ownership of development strategies on
the part of recipients, which would require general budget support rather
than a proliferation of projects. Emergency relief and reconstruction is an
aid category that has recently gained importance.9
The overall pattern of aid masks substantial variations across donors
(Table 2). The share of aid goingto the social sector rangesfrom 23 percent
inJapan to 50percent inNorway. Withinthis aid category, it is striking that
France and Germany put a strong focus on education but spend very little
on primary education, even though the MDGs require donors to concen-
trate on basic education. Likewise, the composition of educational aid by
Denmark,Japan, and the EU does not suggest a strong orientation towards
the respective MDG. Only in the Netherlands, Norway, and particularly in
the United Kingdom, primary education carries markedly higher weight.
The leading position of the United Kingdom carries over to the concen-
tration of aid on basic health services and population programs (mainly
spending on HIV/AIDS), where it is followed by the United States, Den-
mark, and Norway. As in education, the health-related aid committed by
FranceandJapandoesnotappeartoﬁnancebasicservicesfromwhichpoor
population segments might beneﬁt most. Denmark and Germany are the
only donors that provide a non-negligible share of total aid for basic water
and sanitation.
8 We also considered nominal aid. The results for nominal aid hardly differed from those
for grant equivalents, which is not surprising given the extremely high grant element of
aid (Nunnenkamp et al. 2005). Consequently, we do not report the results for nominal aid
below.
9 The empirical ﬁnding that aid can be highly effective in post-conﬂict situations (Collier
and Hoefﬂer 2004) lends support to this new priority of donors.Thiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 601
Table 1: Distribution of Aid (grant equivalent) by All Donors across Sectors,
1990–1992 and 2002–2004 (percent of total aid)a
Sectors 1990–1992 2002–2004
Social infrastructure and services 20.7 34.5
Education, total 5.9 8.2
Basic education 0.8 2.8
Health, total 3.1 4.8
Basic health 1.3 3.0
Population programs and
reproductive health 1.7 3.8
Water supply and sanitation 4.9 3.9
Basic water and sanitation 1.1 0.8
Economic infrastructure 21.0 13.4
Production sectors 17.7 7.3
Multisector/cross-cutting 10.1 8.5
General environmental protection 1.6 1.9
W o m e ni nd e v e l o p m e n t 0 . 1 0 . 1
Commodity aid/general program assistance 20.0 9.6
General budget support 12.5 7.0
Action relating to debt 6.8 10.2
Emergency assistance and reconstruction 2.7 10.4
Support to NGOs 0.1 1.9
Other 0.9 4.2
a Period average of aid commitments.
Source: OECD (2006).
Among the other aid categories that are mainly related to social rather
than economic objectives, environmental protection and the promotion of
gender equality, which both explicitly correspond to MDGs (see Appendix
TableA1),havereceivedlittleattentionbymostdonors.Thesmallerdonors
except Norway channel a considerable part of their aid budget through
NGOs.Similartosocialsectoraid,thesefundsareunlikelytospureconomic
growth in the short to medium term as various NGOs focus on providing
social services rather than ﬁnancing projects in economic infrastructure or
production sectors.
Insummary,mostdonors’sectoralaidcompositionappearstobeinline
with a multidimensional objective function rather than one that narrowly
focuses on economic growth. At the same time, the focus of aid differs
considerably across donors as well as across MDG-related targets. In the
subsequent section, we will examine in more detail whether donors have
succeeded in reaching their multiple objectives by carefully targeting aid to
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3 Relating Aid Allocation to Aid Objectives
3.1 Approach and Data
In order to assess whether aid committed in 2002–2004 was conducive to
achieving the MDGs, we proceed as follows. First, we select various indi-
cators reﬂecting the situation of recipient countries in the year 2000 (or
the closest year if no data are available for 2000) with regard to the MDGs
(“indicators of need”).10 The choice of indicators is very much in line with
thelistofindicatorssuggestedbytheWorldBanktoevaluateprogressmade
towards the MDGs.11 We do not consider more traditional aid targets such
asthedevelopmentofinfrastructurefacilitiesandagriculturaldevelopment,
eventhoughaidininfrastructureandproductionsectorssuchasagriculture
continued to be important for some donors (see Table 2). Recent research
has indicated that aid granted for improved infrastructure, notably with
regard to transportation systems and energysupply, as well as for overcom-
ing agricultural supply bottlenecks may help alleviate poverty and, thus,
contribute to achieving the MDGs (Agence Française de Développement et
al. 2005). However, in this paper we focus on aid items and indicators of
need that are directly related to the MDGs.
Second, we select various aid categories from the sectorally disaggre-
gat edD A Cdatabaseonaidc ommitments(Creditor Reporting System)that
are supposed to be most relevant for aid to be effective in contributing to
the MDGs. The selection of aid categories ranges from very speciﬁc cate-
gories such as basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation (so-called
5-digit CRS purpose codes) to more broadly deﬁned categories such as ed-
ucation and health (so-called DAC sector codes). In addition, we consider
aid commitments in all sectors combined to assess whether the pursuit of
speciﬁc targetswasstrongenough toshowupinoverallaidallocations. The
matching of aid targets, indicators of need and aid categories is speciﬁed in
t h eA p p e n d i xT a b l eA 1 .
We employ Tobit models to assess whether donors allocated total as
well as sector-speciﬁc aid in accordance to indicators of need for an overall
sampleof140recipientcountries.12 TheTobitapproachischosenbecauseit
10 For the complete list of indicators, deﬁnitions and data sources, see the Appendix
Table A1.
11 See, for example, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=
LNAV01HOME1; or: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Resources/
Document/DC2003-0003-Add.1all.pdf.
12 As detailed when presenting the results, the number of observations is sometimes con-
siderably smaller due to missing data for speciﬁc indicators of need.604 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
takes the truncation of the aid variable into account.13 This is of particular
relevance for smaller donors such as Norway and Denmark, which tend to
concentrate their aid on a few recipients. With many “zero” observations,
OLS estimates are biased as they do not capture the nonlinearity in the
estimated relationship.
Apart from the MDG-related indicators of need, we include per capita
income and governance as explanatory variables. The per capita income of
recipientcountriescanbeinterpretedasanencompassing indicator ofneed
and has repeatedly been shown to shape donors’ aggregate aid allocations
(Berthélemy 2006; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006;
Neumayer 2003).Per capita income may also have an impact on the alloca-
tionofsector-speciﬁcaid.Ontheonehand,somespeciﬁcindicatorsofneed,
though far from all, are highly correlated with per capita income.14 Hence,
the impact of speciﬁc indicators of need may be taken up by per capita
income. On the other hand, donors may refer to rather broad measures of
need even when deciding on the allocation of sector-speciﬁc aid.15
Asconcernsgovernance,somerecentstudiessuggestthatrecipientcoun-
tries receive less aid than indicators of need would suggest because they are
badly governed (Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006).
One option to control for governance would be to use the World Bank’s
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). We decided against
this option as publicly available information on the CPIA is still rudimen-
taryandtheuseofitwouldreducethenumberofobservationsconsiderably.
Rather, we employ “voice and accountability,” an institutional index pro-
videdbyKaufmannetal.(2005)thatreferstotheextenttowhichacountry’s
citizens can participate in selecting their governments, as well as to free-
dom of expression, association and the media. As such, the index serves
as a proxy for the development of democratic institutions. Democracy is
often mentioned by donors as an important precondition for aid to be ef-
fective, and there is at least some evidence (e.g., Gates and Hoefﬂer 2004)
that donors have acted accordingly by giving more aid to democratic gov-
13 Heckman’s sample selection model and a two-step Probit estimation have been sug-
gested as alternative approaches to deal with the truncated nature of aid variables
(Berthélemy and Tichit 2004). For an explanation why the Tobit approach may be consid-
ered the preferred option, see Canavire et al. (2006).
14 Pairwise correlations with per capita income exceed 0.6 for several indicators of need
(e.g., average years of schooling, births attended by skilled health staff, access to sanita-
tion). By contrast, correlations with per capita income are below 0.1 for some indicators,
most surprisingly perhaps for the prevalence of HIV.
15 See also the discussion of fungibility below.Thiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 605
ernments. We also considered the level of corruption, another element of
governance typically emphasized in donor statements, but this variable
turnedouttobeinsigniﬁcantinallbutafewcases,supporting whatAlesina
and Weder (2002) found for an earlier period. Results for corruption are
therefore not reported below.
We deliberately do not controlfor variables that reﬂect the donors’ self-
interest when allocating aid. This is not to ignore that donors do pursue
their own economic and political interests when deciding on aid (Alesina
and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Canavire et al. 2006; Dreher,
Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006). The self-interest of donors may well have
the effect thatmany ofthe coefﬁcients reported below remaininsigniﬁcant.
Butthis would not invalidate the conclusiontobe drawnfrominsigniﬁcant
coefﬁcients, namely that donors contributed less to achieving the MDGs
than public statements suggest.
Yet,ourapproachhassomelimitations. Arguably,theindicatorsofneed
maybeendogenoustotheallocationofaid.Forexample,thecorrelationbe-
tween theprimary school enrolmentratioin recipient countriesandaid for
basic education may understate the extent to which donors took low enrol-
mentratiosintoaccountwhendecidingontheallocationofeducationalaid
aseducationalaidmayhelpraiseprimaryenrolment.However,reversecau-
sationof thissortshouldnotpose a majorproblemforouranalysisbecause
of the considerable time lags involved. As shown by Clemens et al. (2004),
less than half of total aid can reasonably be expected to have short-term
effects on the economic performance of recipient countries. Furthermore,
at least some of the indicators used here are clearly exogenous.16 For other
indicators,theriskofreversecausationisminimized byusingdatafor2000,
whereas aid data refer to 2002–2004.
Furthermore, even if the allocation of sector-speciﬁc aid was in line
with the MDGs, this would not necessarily imply higher foreign plus local
resources devoted to speciﬁc targets. The fungibility of aid may undermine
donor attempts to direct more funds to speciﬁc targets. However, aid for,
say, basic education or rural infrastructure is unlikely to be fully fungible
(Feyzioglu et al. 1998).17 This is particularly true in countries heavily
16 For example, “malaria ecology” represents an ecologically based indicator that is pre-
dictive of the extent of malaria transmission and combines information on temperature,
mosquito abundance and mosquito vector type.
17 In an evaluation of a rural road rehabilitation project in Vietnam, van de Walle and Mu
(2007) show that, on balance, more roads were built in project areas, indicating less than
full fungibility.606 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
dependent on aid, where the large contribution of aid to public budgets
limits the discretion of local governments to shift resources. The observa-
tion that donors devoted an increasing share of aid to speciﬁc purposes
such as basic education and basic health (see Table 2) indeed suggests that
they expected fungibility to be limited. Otherwise, the ﬁne-tuning of aid
according to speciﬁc purposes would not make sense. In any case, donors
are hardly to blame if the correlation with indicators of need turns out
to be weaker for total (foreign and local) ﬁnancing than for aid ﬁnancing
alone. This leaves the question of whether the allocation of sector-speciﬁc
aid is driven by need in a broader sense rather than speciﬁc sector-related
indicators of need. As noted before, the inclusion of per capita income in
the regressions for sector-speciﬁc aid may help to answer this question.
The coefﬁcient of per capita income (the encompassing indicator of need)
should then be negative, whereas the coefﬁcient of the speciﬁc indicator of
need should be insigniﬁcant.
Inrunningthe regressions, we distinguish an unweighted anda popula-
tion-weighted version of the Tobit model. The unweighted model follows
the bulk of the aid allocation literature in that each recipient country,
independent of its size, is treated as an observation with an equal weight
attached to it. The rationale behind this speciﬁcation is that donors tend
to decide on aid portfolios at the country level. Aid quotas for individual
countries have been shown to be fairly stable in the short run, even if
countries become less needy or experience changes in institutional quality
(NunnenkampandThiele 2006).Moreover,attachingmoreweightto more
populated recipient countries is difﬁcult to reconcile with the frequently
observed small-country bias, according to which per capita aid tends to be
higher for smaller recipient countries. However, the traditional approach
of assessing the allocation of aid may be inappropriate when it comes
to analyzing whether the allocation of aid is in line with the MDGs.18
Arguably, giving equal weight to all recipient countries is in contrast to the
MDGs, which refer to percentages of the global population. This is why
we weight the explanatory variables by the respective country’s population
in a modiﬁed Tobit model so that the unit of observation is no longer
the country but rather the individual. Results for the weighted model are
likely to be driven largely by China and India, which together account for
47 percent of the population of all sample countries. In order to assess the
sensitivity of results, we re-estimate the weighted model without these two
18 We owe this important point to an anonymous referee.Thiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 607
hugely populated countries. As will be shown below, our results strongly
depend on the choice between these models.
3.2 Results for Aid by All Donors
We ﬁrst investigate whether all donors taken together considered MDG-
related indicators of need when allocating aid. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate
(i) whether indicators of need affected speciﬁc aid categories such as basic
health and basic education; (ii) whether or not the relationship persists
on the next level of aid aggregation such as health and education; and
(iii) whether the indicator was considered important enough by donors to
have shaped the allocation of total aid. We estimate all three versions of the
T o b i tm o d e l ,a l w a y sc o n t r o l l i n gf o rG D Pp e rc a p i t aa sw e l la s“ v o i c ea n d
accountability.”
In the unweighted Tobit model, both GDP per capita and “voice and
accountability”turnouttobesigniﬁcantwiththeexpectedsigninallbutthe
CO2 emissions regression when we look at total commitments.19 Donors
thus appear to target foreign aid towards poorer and more democratic
recipients. The general poverty orientation of aid we ﬁnd is very much
in accordance with the previous literature (e.g., Dollar and Levin 2006;
Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006). At the same time, our analysis adds to
the hitherto limited evidence (in particular, Gates and Hoefﬂer 2004) that
points to donors rewarding democratic institutions.
In a number of cases, GDP per capita and “voice and accountabili-
ty” remain signiﬁcant at lower levels of disaggregation. For example, the
allocation ofaidforbasic education aswell asaidforpopulation andrepro-
ductive health programs is shown to be targeted to poorer recipients with
more democratic institutions. The same applies to developmental food aid,
aﬁndingthatisconsistent witharecentstudy byNeumayer(2005),accord-
ing to which self-interest on the part of donors has not played a role in the
distribution of food aid.
Turning to our variables of particular interest, aid appears to be only
weakly targeted according to speciﬁc indicators of need (Table 3). Notable
exceptions are the ﬁght against hunger and HIV/AIDS, and to a lesser
extent the provision of access to improved water. But even these indicators
donotremainsigniﬁcantathigherlevelsofaidaggregation.Theprevalence
19 Results for the control variables are not reported in the tables; detailed results are avail-
able from the authors upon request.608 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
Table 3: Tobit Results for Total Aid by All Donors (unweighted)a
Targets/indicators of needb Aid categoriesc
Developmental Emergency Target 2: Hunger Total aid food aid food aid
•Undernourishment (99) 0.03 0.01 0.04∗∗∗
•Malnutrition of children (83) −0.67∗∗∗ −0.03∗ 0.02
Target 3: Primary schooling Total aid Education Basic education
•Net primary enrolment (89) −0.20 0.02 −0.02
•Primary completion rate (98) 0.03 0.02 −0.01
•Average years of schooling (71) 0.76 0.27 0.08
Target 4: Gender disparity in education Total aid Education Basic education
•Ratio girls/boys in education (110) 0.14 0.05 −0.01
•Literacy ratio, males/females (89) −5.87 0.09 −0.14
Target 5: Under-5 mortality Total aid Health Basic health
•Under-5 mortality rate (121) −0.02 −0.01 0.00
•Immunization, measles (121) 0.14 0.02 0.00
Target 6: Maternal mortality Total aid Health Basic health
•Maternal mortality ratio (113) 0.00 0.00 0.00
•Births attended (99) 0.42∗ 0.03 0.01
Population Target 7: HIV/AIDS Total aid Health programs
•Prevalence of HIV (92) −0.01 −0.01 0.08∗∗∗
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases Total aid Health Basic health
•Incidence tuberculosis (121) −0.02 0.00 0.00
•Malaria ecology (111) 0.11 0.02 0.01
Environmental Agricultural land Target 9: Environmental sustainability Total aid protection resources
•CO2 emissions (120) −1.77 −0.06∗ 0.00
•Forest area (117) 0.21 0.01 0.00
•Nationally protected areas (130) 0.10∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗
•GDP per unit of energy use (79) −0.09 0.03 0.03
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum Water supply & Basic drinking Total aid dwellers sanitation water
•Access to improved water (113) −0.03 0.03 −0.00∗
•Access to improved sanitation (111) 0.11 0.03∗ −0.00
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
a Based on a Tobit model estimated with per capita income and governance as controls; controls
and constant term not reported. — b Number of observations in parentheses. For deﬁnition and
sources, see Appendix Table A1 and A2. — c Period average of grant equivalent of aid in 2002–
2004, per capita of the recipient countries’ population.
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Appendix Table A1.Thiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 609
of HIV/AIDS, for instance, had an impact on the size of donor-ﬁnanced
population and reproductive health programs but not on the allocation of
aid for the entire health sector or total aid.
Attheleveloftotalaid,twoindicatorsofneed—malnutritionofchildren
and the number of births attended by skilled health staff—are signiﬁcant
but carry an unexpected sign. This is likely to be caused by the correlation
of these variables with GDPper capita. If we re-run the regressions without
GDP per capita, both coefﬁcients become insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, the
resultsforenvironmentalsustainability(target9)areinconﬂictwiththeun-
derlying assumption that donors may have considered the listed indicators
toreﬂecttheneedforenvironmentalaid.Ifanything,theopposite wastrue.
In the case of CO2 emissions, this is because per capita emissions increase
in line with rising per capita income of recipient countries.20 Whatever the
environmental concerns donors might have wished to address by granting
aid, they were dominated by the general poverty orientation of aid when
it comes to the correlation between aid and CO2 emissions. In the case of
nationally protected areas, the positive correlation with aid committed to
environmental protection suggests that the focus of donors was on helping
protect existing habitats, rather than ﬁnancing the creation of new ones
where nationally protected areas accounted for a small percentage of total
land area.
If we weigh all recipients by the size of their population, results change
quite dramatically. In contrast to the unweighted model, GDP per capita
often remains insigniﬁcant and “voice and accountability” turns out to
be insigniﬁcant almost across the board. As detailed below, this surpris-
ing result is mainly due to the high weights attached to China and India.
On the other hand, the estimates in Table 4 show that several additional
MDG-related targets in the ﬁeld of education (primary completion rates,
average years of schooling21) and health (under-ﬁve mortality, maternal
mortality, tuberculosis and malaria) affected the donors’ decisions. These
targets as well as those already found signiﬁcant in the unweighted re-
gressions are not only linked to speciﬁc aid categories, but also inﬂuenced
the allocation of total aid. The weighted regressions thus suggest a more
20 The correlation between these two variables is as high as 0.60.
21 It has to be noted that this indicator is clearly inferior to the other two indicators
supposed to reﬂect the situation of recipient countries with regard to primary schooling.
Target 3 requires donors to focus on primary education, while average years of school-
ing (which we considered in accordance to the World Bank suggestions mentioned above)
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widespread targeting of aid according to speciﬁc indicators of need, even
though certain indicators such as net primary school enrolment rates, the
male-to-female literacy ratio and the rate of immunization against measles
remain insigniﬁcant.
Replicating the weighted regressions without China and India illus-
trates that these two countries have a decisive inﬂuence on the population-
weighted Tobit results. For a start, the allocation of total aid is now again
strongly poverty oriented, with the coefﬁcient of GDP per capita being
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level or better in all speciﬁcations. In most
instances, donors also appear to have considered GDP per capita as an
encompassing indicator of need when allocating aid to speciﬁc sectors.
Likewise, once India and China are excluded from the sample, “voice and
accountability” becomes an important determinant of sector-speciﬁc aid.
At the most disaggregated aid level, we ﬁnd that donors were consistently
more generous towards poorer and more democratic recipients except for
thecaseofemergencyfoodaid,whichisdrivenbyspeciﬁcneed.Thestronger
impact of GDP per capita and “voice and accountability” in this version of
the Tobit model is mainly due to the exclusion of India, which constitutes
an outlier in the sense that it received very little aid per capita despite being
a relatively poor country with democratic institutions. China is richer and
moreautocratic,butitsaidinﬂowswerestilllowerthantheprevailinglevels
of per capita income and governance would predict.
Table 5 reports the effects of the MDG-related indicators of need on
aid allocations. The number of signiﬁcant coefﬁcients is somewhat lower
than in the weighted regressions that include China and India, especially
at higher levels of aid aggregation. The overall conclusion remains the
same, however: Donors tend to regard MDG-related indicators of need as
relevant determinants of aid allocations, but there are again severalnotable
exceptions. For example, aid for basic water supply and sanitation is found
to be unaffected by the number ofpeople with access to safe drinking water
and sanitation when China and India are excluded.
In sum, the prevalence of undernourishment and HIV/AIDS are the
only MDG-related indicators of need that robustly shaped sector-speciﬁc
aid per capita given by all donors. The evidence on health-related targets
is stronger if we only look at the weighted estimates, which come closer to
analyzing whether the allocation of aid is in line with the MDGs and on
which we will focus in the remainder of the paper. Three additional health-
related indicators—the under-ﬁve-mortality rate, the maternal mortality
ratio, and the incidence of tuberculosis—are found to affect the amountThiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 611
Table 4: Tobit Results for Total Aid by All Donors (weighted;
incl. China and India)a
Targets/indicators of needb Aid categoriesc
Developmental Emergency Target 2: Hunger Total aid food aid food aid
•Undernourishment 0.51∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
•Malnutrition of children −0.53∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ 0.02
Target 3: Primary schooling Total aid Education Basic education
•Net primary enrolment −0.21∗ −0.01 −0.01
•Primary completion rate −0.32∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗
•Average years of schooling −4.26∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
Target 4: Gender disparity in education Total aid Education Basic education
•Ratio girls/boys in education 0.17 0.02 −0.01
•Literacy ratio, males/females 0.50 0.57 0.26
Target 5: Under-5 mortality Total aid Health Basic health
•Under-5 mortality rate 0.10∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
•Immunization, measles 0.15∗∗ 0.01 0.00
Target 6: Maternal mortality Total aid Health Basic health
•Maternal mortality ratio 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
•Births attended 0.25∗∗ 0.00 0.00
Population Target 7: HIV/AIDS Total aid Health programs
•Prevalence of HIV 1.28∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases Total aid Health Basic health
•Incidence tuberculosis 0.03∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
•Malaria ecology 0.83∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
Environmental Agricultural land Target 9: Environmental sustainability Total aid protection resources
•CO2 emissions −1.33 −0.02 −0.02
•Forest area 0.19∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00
•Nationally protected areas 0.16 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00
•GDP per unit of energy use 0.12 0.01 0.01
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum Water supply & Basic drinking Total aid dwellers sanitation water
•Access to improved water −0.33∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.01∗∗∗
•Access to improved sanitation 0.36∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00
∗∗∗,∗∗, ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
a Based on a Tobit model estimated with per capita income and governance as control variables;
controls and constant term not reported. — b For deﬁnition and sources, see Appendix Table A1
and A2. — c Period average of grant equivalent of aid in 2002–2004, per capita of the recipient
countries’ population.
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Appendix Table A1.612 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
Table 5: Tobit Results for Total Aid by All Donors (weighted;
excl. China and India)a
Targets/indicators of needb Aid categoriesc
Developmental Emergency Target 2: Hunger Total aid food aid food aid
•Undernourishment 0.38∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
•Malnutrition of children −0.49∗∗∗ −0.01 0.02
Target 3: Primary schooling Total aid Education Basic education
•Net primary enrolment −0.17 −0.01 −0.01
•Primary completion rate −0.20∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.01
•Average years of schooling −0.68 −0.18 −0.15∗
Target 4: Gender disparity in education Total aid Education Basic education
•Ratio girls/boys in education −0.18 −0.01 −0.01
•Literacy ratio, males/females 0.55 0.82 0.40∗∗
Target 5: Under-5 mortality Total aid Health Basic health
•Under-5 mortality rate 0.04 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
•Immunization, measles 0.06 0.01 0.00
Target 6: Maternal mortality Total aid Health Basic health
•Maternal mortality ratio 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
•Births attended 0.24∗∗∗ 0.01 0.00
Population Target 7: HIV/AIDS Total aid Health programs
•Prevalence of HIV 0.56∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases Total aid Health Basic health
•Incidence tuberculosis 0.00 0.00 0.00∗
•Malaria ecology 0.11 0.02 0.01
Environmental Agricultural land Target 9: Environmental sustainability Total aid protection resources
•CO2 emissions −0.36 0.00 0.00
•Forest area 0.07 0.00 0.00
•Nationally protected areas 0.04 0.01∗ 0.00
•GDP per unit of energy use 0.39 0.00 0.00
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum Water supply & Basic drinking Total aid dwellers sanitation water
•Access to improved water −0.13 −0.01 −0.01
•Access to improved sanitation 0.01 0.01 −0.01
∗∗∗,∗∗, ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
a Based on a Tobit model estimated with per capita income and governance as control variables;
controls and constant term not reported. — b For deﬁnition and sources, see Appendix Table A1
and A2. — c Period average of grant equivalent of aid in 2002–2004, per capita of the recipient
countries’ population.
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Appendix Table A1.Thiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 613
of aid allocated to basic health, irrespective of whether China and India
are included. For education (MDG targets 2 and 3) as well as for water and
sanitation(MDGtargets10and11),however,thelinkbetweenindicatorsof
need and aid categories remains weak: only the most imperfect educational
indicator, average years of schooling, is signiﬁcant in both speciﬁcations of
the weighted model. This ﬁnding is consistent with Table 1 in Section 2,
whereit wasshownthatdonorsdevoted onlyabout onethirdofeducation-
relatedaidtobasiceducationand20percentofaidforwaterandsanitationto
basic services, whereas two thirds of health-related aid went to basic health.
Inotherwords, thepersistent biasofdonorstowardshigherlevelsofservice
provision may haveunderminedeffortstoensurethatallchildren complete
a full course of primary education, that gender disparity in education is
eradicated, and that poor people have access to safe drinking water and
sanitation.
3.3 Donor-Speciﬁc Aid
As noted in Section 1, earlier studies have shown that the allocation of
aid differs signiﬁcantly between donors (e.g., Berthélemy 2006; Dollar and
Levin2006).However,previousstudiesdonotconsiderspeciﬁcindicatorsof
needrelatedtotheMDGs,nordotheydisaggregateaid.Inthefollowing,we
compare the allocation of aid across the eleven (bilateral and multilateral)
donors listed in Section 2 by employing the Tobit approach with MDG-
related indicators of need.22
Especiallywhenconsideringthetargetingofsector-speciﬁcaid,itmaybe
arguedthatdifferencesbetweendonorscouldbeduetodonorcoordination.
Each donor might focus on speciﬁc MDG targets and specialize in speciﬁc
aid sectors such as aid for education, leaving other targets and sectors to
otherdonors.Hence,insigniﬁcantresultsforaparticulardonorwithrespect
to various other targets and aid categories would not necessarily point to
this donor having ignored the MDGs, but rather to a division of labor with
other donors.
However, donor coordination of this sort is highly unlikely to seriously
affect our results. This is not to ignore that coordination ﬁgures high on
the policy agenda of donors. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of
March 2005 re-emphasized donor commitments made two years earlier at
22 For the reasons stated above, this section presents only the results from the weighted
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the High-Level ForumonHarmonizationinRome,including “to eliminate
duplication of efforts and to rationalize donor activities to make them
as cost-effective as possible.” But little appears to have been achieved in
this respect so far. A recent progress report on aid effectiveness notes:
“When measured against the commitments..., there is not yet sufﬁcient
momentum in applying good practice.... Many aid agencies still have in
place arrangements that discourage, often unintentionally, the approaches
andbehaviours necessary tomeet theRomeandMarrakechcommitments”
(OECD and World Bank 2005: 14).
Empirical ﬁndings support the view that donor coordination remains
elusive. Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) apply non-nested tests to distin-
guishbetweennon-cooperative(Nash–Cournot)andcooperative(Lindahl)
behavior. None of the 15 donors considered by these authors behaved co-
operatively when deciding on the allocation of aid. Berthélemy and Tichit
(2004) employ aid provided by other bilateral donors as a control variable
whenanalyzingtheallocationofaidbyindividualdonorcountries, inorder
to test whether donors take note of aid allocations by other donors. If co-
ordination andspecialization were prevalent,the coefﬁcient of this variable
shouldbenegative.However,ifsigniﬁcant,thecoefﬁcienttypicallyturnsout
tobepositive,suggestingthatdonorstendtofavorthesame“aiddarlings.”23
We corroboratethis ﬁnding by a simple correlation analysis reported in the
Appendix Table A3. It turns out that 43 out of the 55 Spearman rank cor-
relations for total aid per capita are signiﬁcantly positive. Sector-speciﬁc
aid of individual donors tends to be less strongly correlated with that of
other donors, but most of the correlations are still positive and very few are
signiﬁcantly negative.24
With donor coordination being unlikely to affect the interpretation of
our results, we proceed in two steps. For a start, we estimate the weighted
Tobit model with total aidper capita received fromindividual donorsasthe
dependentvariable.Furtherbelow,weturntosector-speciﬁc aid.MDGtar-
get9“Environmentalsustainability” isnolongerconsideredforthereasons
given above. Control variables are the same as for all donors combined.
23 Some small donors not considered in our paper (Belgium, Ireland, and Italy) provide
exceptions.
24 In the Appendix Table A3, we report the correlations for health-related aid, for which
there is just one signiﬁcantly negative correlation (between France and the United King-
dom). Similar results were achieved for aid related to water and sanitation (not shown).
As concerns aid for education, ﬁve out of 55 correlation coefﬁcients turned out to be sig-
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With some notable exceptions, the allocation of total aid is signiﬁcantly
affected by per capita income of the recipient countries (not shown in the
table). Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom and IDA consistently grant
less aid to more developed recipients. In most instances, per capita income
enters negatively also for Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Norway, at
leastwhenChinaandIndiaareexcluded.Strikingly,however,thecoefﬁcient
ofpercapitaincomeremainsinsigniﬁcantinalmost allestimates forFrance
and the United States, and in various cases also for the EU.25
Similartotheresultsforalldonorscombined,“voiceandaccountability”
in the recipient countries has not shaped the allocation of total aid in the
weighted model with China and India included. This applies to all donors
under consideration, mainly because India got little aid in per-capita terms
whileitwasratedfavorablywithrespect to“voiceandaccountability.” Once
China and India are excluded, Denmark and the United Kingdom stand
out in that they consistently favored more democratic recipients. Though
less consistently so, we ﬁnd similar results for Japan and the Netherlands.
In the case of Japan, this is probably due to its aid being focused on Asian
neighbors which tend to be relatively well governed. On the other hand,
“voice and accountability” has no effect on the allocation of aid by France,
Sweden,theUnitedStatesandIDA.Asconcernsthetwobigbilateraldonors,
thisﬁndingissupportedbytherecentliterature,mostrobustlysoforFrance
(Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006) whereas the poor
evidence for IDA and Sweden contrasts with Dollar and Levin (2006).
Turning to our variables of principal interest, i.e., MDG-related indica-
tors ofneed, Table6 showsthat, once again,results depend considerablyon
theinclusionofChinaandIndia.Some implausible results fortheweighted
model with all recipients are driven exclusively by these two heavyweights.
For example, the unexpected coefﬁcients of malnutrition of children, the
ratio of girls to boys in education and access to improved sanitation largely
disappear intheestimates without ChinaandIndia.Atthesametime, some
favorableresultsindicatingthatspeciﬁcindicatorsofneedhadanimpacton
the allocation of total aid, as suggested by the MDGs, weaken considerably
when the sample does not include China and India. Most notably, the ev-
idence that greater need was associated with higher total aid per capita
weakens for MDG targets 3 (primary schooling) and 7 (HIV/AIDS).
25 France and the US are also among the bilateral donors considered by Berthélemy and
Tichit (2004) that take less note of the income poverty of the recipients.616 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
Itis mainly fortheNetherlands, andsomewhat less forGermany, Japan,
and Sweden, that the results depend strongly on the sample underlying
the weighted Tobit model. Results are largely unaffected for Denmark and
IDA.26 Basedonthecompletesampleofrecipients,Table6pointstostriking
differences between donors as concerns the extent to which speciﬁc indica-
tors of need had an impact on the allocation of total aid. French aid as well
as EU aid was directed to more needy recipients according to ten out of the
16 speciﬁc indicators under consideration. This does not necessarily imply
that these two donors outperformed the other donors in terms of targeting
aid to needy recipients since, as noted before, the per capita income of re-
cipients typically remained insigniﬁcant in the estimates for France andthe
EU.However,theﬁne-tuning ofFrenchandEUaidaccordingtospeciﬁc in-
dicators of need qualiﬁes earlier verdicts that the poverty orientation of aid
by these two donors is particularly weak (see also below on sector-speciﬁc
aid). Denmark represents the opposite case: While none of the speciﬁc in-
dicators of need shows up signiﬁcantly with the expected sign, Danish aid
was strongly related to overall need as reﬂected by per capita income.
Yet Table 6, in combination with the ﬁndings on per capita income
reported above, reveals that some donors underperformed in allocating
their total aid according to the MDGs. This particularly applies to the
two largest bilateral donors in terms of total aid commitments in 2002–
2004. US aid was shaped neither by speciﬁc indicators of need (with only
two exceptions, i.e., the prevalence of undernourishment and the primary
completion rate),nor byper capitaincome asanencompassing indicator of
need. Japan stands out in that various speciﬁc indicators of need enter with
an unexpected sign (pointing to more aid for less needy recipients), even
though the coefﬁcient ofper capita incomeremains insigniﬁcant invarious
estimates for the complete sample of recipients.
In the second step, we estimate the weighted Tobit model with sector-
speciﬁc aid as the dependent variable. In particular, we assess whether
individual donors targeted aid in the sense that: (i) food aid was granted
predominantly to recipient countries whose population suffered frommal-
nutrition and hunger; (ii) the health situation of recipient countries has
shaped the allocation of health-related aid; (iii) aid for education was
channeled to where primary education deﬁcits and gender disparities in
26 Denmark committed less than 2 percent of its aid to China and India in 2002–2004.
At the opposite extreme, China and India accounted for 23 percent of Japan’s overall com-
mitments. IDA committed hardly any aid to China, while India was a major recipient with
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education were most pronounced; and (iv) aid for improved water supply
and sanitation favored recipients with seriously impaired access to water
and sanitation.
As before, we control for per capita income and “voice and account-
ability.” Findings with respect to the MDG-related indicators of need are
summarized in Table 7. In some respects, sector-speciﬁc results resemble
the results for total aid. In various instances, it depends on the inclusion of
ChinaandIndiaofwhetherornotspeciﬁcindicatorsofneedhaveanimpact
on the allocation of sector-speciﬁc aid. For example, the ﬁnding that less
common access to improved sanitation went along with more aid granted
by several donors for water supply and sanitation no longer applies when
thetwoheavyweightsareexcluded.Ontheotherhand,afewdonorsgranted
more health-related aid to countries with higher maternal mortality ratios,
but only in the sample without China and India.
It is also in line with earlier ﬁndings that some donors appear to have
taken note of speciﬁc indicators of need (France, Norway, and the UK),
whereas other donors have not or only rarely done so (Japan, Denmark,
Sweden, the US and IDA). As for total aid, France ﬁne-tuned its sector-
speciﬁc aid according to MDG-related indicators of need, while per capita
income typically remained insigniﬁcant.27 This is in contrast to Norway,
whose allocation of sector-speciﬁc aid was affected by both speciﬁc and
encompassing indicatorsofneed invarious instances. Likewise, whencom-
paring donors for whom MDG-related indicators of need appear to have
played a minor role, it must be taken into account that Denmark, Sweden
andIDAgrantedhighersector-speciﬁc aidwith fewexceptions torecipients
with lower per capita income (not shown in the table). This was hardly
the case for Japan, and per capita income of recipients entered signiﬁcantly
negative in just abouthalf of all regressions runforsector-speciﬁc aid ofthe
United States.
Table 7 also offers some additional insights on whether donors have
specialized in helping achieve selected MDGs, and leaving other MDGs to
other donors. Donor coordination to this effect should have resulted in
a pattern where at least smaller donors concentrated on speciﬁc targets.
However, donors such as Norway and the Netherlands are listed under as
manyMDGtargetsas arelargedonorssuch asFrance,the United Kingdom
27 For the complete sample of recipient countries, there was actually just one signiﬁcantly
negative coefﬁcient for per capita income out of 32 estimates run for sector-speciﬁc aid of
France (Norway: 21; UK: 25).620 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
Table 7: Donor-Speciﬁc Results: Sector-Speciﬁc Aida
Targets/indicators of needb Aid category
Target 2: Hunger Development food aid Emergency food aid
•Undernourishment IDA, (EU) Ger, US, EU
•Malnutrion of children Neth, Nor, UK,I D A Neth, Nor,
UK, US,E U
Target 3: Primary schooling Education Basic education
•Net primary enrolment – –
•Primary completion rate Fra,G e r –
•Average years of schooling – Nor
Target 4: Gender disparity in education Education Basic education
•Ratio girls/boys in education – Fra,( Ger)
•Literacy ratio, males/females Fra Fra, Ger,( Den)
Target 5: Under-5 mortality Health Basic health
•Under-5 mortality rate Fra –
•Immunization, measles (Fra) IDA
Target 6: Maternal mortality Health Basic health
•Maternal mortality ratio (Ger), (Nor) (Nor), (UK)
•Births attended UK Neth, UK, IDA
Target 7: HIV/AIDS Health Population programs
•Prevalence of HIV Nor,( S w e ) Den, Fra, Neth, Nor
Swe, UK, US, EU
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases Health Basic health
•Incidence tuberculosis Neth, Nor,( S w e ) , Neth,( U K )
(UK), (EU)
•Malaria ecology Fra (Fra)
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum Water supply & Basic drinking
dwellers sanitation water
•Access to improved water – –
•Access to improved sanitation Den, Nor, Swe, UK, EU Den, EU
a Based on weighted Tobit model with per capita income and governance as control vari-
ables; controls and constant term not reported. Donors listed grant signiﬁcantly more aid to
countries with greater need as given by speciﬁc indicator of need; bold if same result when
China and India are excluded; in parentheses if only when China and India excluded; italics
if per capita income signiﬁcantly negative.
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Appendix Table A1.
or the EU. Moreover, there is little evidence that smaller donors such as
Denmark and Sweden refrained from entering into areas such as the ﬁght
against HIV/AIDS where various large donors are engaged. Nor do they
appear to have grasped the chance to occupy areas which were largelyThiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 621
neglected by other donors; the most notable case in point is aid for basic
education that may help improve primary enrolment and completion.
ItratheremergesthatsomeMDGtargetsreceivedparticularattentionby
various donors, whereas other targets were largely neglected. The evidence
for targeted aid is strongest with regard to the ﬁght against HIV/AIDS
throughcommitting resources to“population programs”.Target7attracted
encompassing donor engagement. Similarly, indicators of need related to
MDGtarget 2 (“Hunger”)were takeninto account by allmajor suppliers of
emergencyfoodaidexceptFrance.Theevidenceiscomparativelyweakwith
respect to so-called developmental food aid. This applies especially to the
UnitedStateswhichcommitteddevelopmentalfoodaidtoanoutstandingly
largenumber of77countriesin2002–2004.Arguably,thistype of“aid” was
still used as an outlet of agricultural surplus production at home, with
needs-based targeting taking second place.
The allocation of aid for education was hardly shaped by speciﬁc indi-
cators of need. Most surprisingly, none of the donors under consideration
took primary enrolment and completion rates into account when deciding
ontheallocationofaidforbasiceducation.Health-related aidappearstobe
somewhat better targeted than education-related aid when accounting for
(unreported)resultsontheimpactofpercapitaincomeonaidallocation:In
ourestimatesforaidforhealthandpopulationprograms,percapitaincome
entered signiﬁcantly negative in about 75 percent of all cases, while this was
trueinjustslightlymorethanhalfofallcasesforaidforeducation.However,
the allocation of health-related aid according to speciﬁc indicators of need
reveals that donors focused on selected targets that ﬁgure prominently in
public debate (HIV/AIDS and, though less so, tuberculosis), whereas less
publicized issues such as the immunization against measles did not receive
particular attention. Essentially the same applies to aid for improving ac-
cess to water and sanitation, once it is taken into account that most of the
coefﬁcients reported in Table 7 are highly sensitive to sample selection.
4C o n c l u d i n gR e m a r k s
This paper departs from the observation that the Millennium Declara-
tion and the list of MDGs consider growth promotion to be just one
channel through which aid may help ﬁghting poverty. In the same vein,
economists such as McGillivray (2003) and Amprou et al. (2007) have
called for a broader concept of aid selectivity not just including the income622 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
andpolicysituationofrecipientcountriesasproposedbyCollierandDollar
(2002).And indeed, donorstypically claimthat their aid allocation is based
on a multidimensional objective function.
Yet, various developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa,
will in all likelihood miss not only the most prominent MDG of halving
absolute poverty by the year 2015 but also the more speciﬁc targets, e.g.,
those related to health and education. In this paper, we explore one pos-
sible reason for this failure, namely that donors may have paid insufﬁcient
attention to the MDGs by not allocating aid according to the MDG-related
needsofrecipients.Ourresultsdosuggestthatatleastpartoftheblamefalls
on insufﬁcient targeting of aid. While some MDGs such as the ﬁght against
HIV/AIDShaveshapedtheallocationofaid,thesector-speciﬁcresultsreveal
that with respect to other MDGs, most notably primary education, there is
a considerable gap between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation.
Comparing donors, it turns out that the two largest bilateral donors,
Japan and the United States, have not only failed to meet the UN target
of 0.7 percent of gross national income to be devoted to aid, but have also
performed poorly in terms of targeting aid to needy recipients. At the same
time, our analysis qualiﬁes previous ﬁndings on the poverty orientation of
donors. France, whose income poverty orientation has often been rated as
weak, took various speciﬁc indicators of need into account when allocating
aid. By contrast, MDG-related indicators of need have hardly shaped the
allocation ofaid by donorssuch as Denmark,which arewidely perceived to
be superior donorsbecause of their strongpoverty orientation as measured
by per capita income of recipient countries.
Theseresultsinvitetheconclusionthatthecurrentfocusonsubstantially
increasing aid in order to turn the tide and try achieving the MDGs misses
an important point: Unless the targeting of aid is improved, higher aid will
nothavethedesiredeffects.Atthesametime,itshouldbestressedthatbetter
targeting is just anecessary, butnotasufﬁcient condition formoreeffective
aid. Reinikka and Svensson (2004), for example, estimate that over the
period 1991–1995,only13percent ofagrantthe Ugandangovernmenthad
received to cover primary schools’ non-wage expenditures actually reached
theschools.Likewise, Easterly(2005)reportsforfourAfricancountriesthat
30 to70 percentofdrugsdistributed by thegovernmentdisappeared before
reaching the patients. Given leakages of such a size, an obvious avenue
for future research would be to directly estimate how effective the sectoral
allocation of aid is in achieving the various MDGs. This would offer more
detailed insights than the typically considered aid-growth relationship.Thiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 623
Appendix
Table A1: Data Sources
MDGs Indicators of need (source)a Relevant aid categoryb
(CRS Code)
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme
proverty and hunger
•Target 1: Halve the Average per-capita income Total aid
proportion of people (World Bank 2005);
with income of less Share of population below
than $1ad a y c $1ad a y ;
Human development index
(UNDP 2005b);
•Target 2: Halve the Prevalence of undernourish- Developmental food aid/
proportion of people who ment (FAO 2004); food security
suffer from hunger Malnutrion of children, assistance (520)
weight (World Bank 2005); Emergency food
aid (710)
Goal 2: Achieve universal
primary education
•Target 3: Ensure Net primary school enrolment Education (110)
that children complete ratio (World Bank 2005); Basic education (112)
a full course of Primary completion rate, total
primary schooling (World Bank 2005);
Average years of schooling
(Barro and Lee 2001);
Goal 3: Promote gender
equality and empower women
•Target 4: Eliminate gender Ratio of girls to boys in Education (110)
disparity in education prim. & sec. education Basic education (112)
(World Bank 2005);
Literacy ratio, males to females
(World Bank 2005);
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
•Target 5: Reduce Under-ﬁve mortality rate Health (120)
under-ﬁve mortality rate (World Bank 2005); Basic health (122)
Immunization, measles
(World Bank 2005);
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
•Target 6: Reduce the maternal Maternal mortality ratio Health (120)
mortality ratio (UNDP 2005b); Basic health (122)
Births attended by skilled
health staff (World Bank
2005; WHO 2005);
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and other diseases
•Target 7: Halt and reverse Prevalence of HIV (World Health (120)
the spread of HIV/AIDS Bank 2005; UNAIDS 2004); Population programs and
reproductive health (130)624 Review of World Economics 2007, Vol. 143 (4)
Table A1: continued
MDGs Indicators of need (source)a Relevant aid categoryb
(CRS Code)
•Target 8: Halt and reverse Incidence of tuberculosis Health (120)
the incidence of malaria, (WHO 2005); Basic health (122)
and other major diseases Malaria ecology (Kiszewski
et al. 2004);
Goal 7: Ensure environmental
sustainability
•Target 9: Integrate principles CO2 emissions per capita General environmental
of sustainable development (World Bank 2005); protection (410)
into country policies and Forest area (World Bank 2005; Agricultural land resources
reverse the loss of environ- FAO 2004); (31130)
mental resources Nationally protected areas
(UNDP 2005b);
GDP per unit of energy use
(World Bank 2005);
•Target 10: Halve the Access to improved water Water supply & sanitation (140)
proportion of people without source (World Bank2005); Basic drinking water supply &
sustainable access to safe Access to improved sanitation basic sanitation
water and basic sanitation (World Bank 2005); (14030)
•Target 11: Achieve Same as under target 10; See target 10
a signiﬁcant improvement
in the lives of slum dwellers
aAll indicators for 2000 or closest year around 2000. Italics if used only in the analysis of aid by all
donors combined. — bIn addition: total aid for all MDGs/indicators of need. Italics if used only in the
analysis of aid by all donors combined. — c Target 1 not speciﬁcally considered in this paper; for an
analysis of the poverty orientation of overall aid, see the literature given in Section 1.Thiele/Nunnenkamp/Dreher: Do Donors Target Aid 625
Table A2: Deﬁnition of Variables
Aid variables
•Grant equivalent per capita nominal amount×grant element/100 per
population of recipient country
Indicators of needa
•Access to improved water source (–) percent of population
•Access to improved sanitation (–) percent of population
•Average years of schooling (–) relates to the total population aged 15
and over
•Births attended by skilled health staff (–) percent of total
•CO2 emissions per capita (+) metric tons per capita
•Forest area (–) percent of total land area
•GDP per unit of energy use (–) 2,000 PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent
•Immunization, measles (–) percent of children of the age of 12–23
months
•Incidence of tuberculosis (+) estimated incidence rate of all forms of
tuberculosis, per 100,000 people
•Literacy ratio, males to females (+) literacy rate of adult males divided by
literacy rate of adult females
•Malaria ecology (+) predictive of the extent of malaria
transmission
•Malnutrition of children, weight (+) percent of children under ﬁve
•Maternal mortality ratio (+) adjusted ratio per 100,000 live births
•Nationally protected areas (–) percent of total land area
•Net primary school enrolment ratio (–) percent of the population of the
corresponding ofﬁcial school age
•Prevalence of HIV (+) percent of population aged 15–49
•Prevalence of undernourishment (+) percent of population
•Primary completion rate, total (–) percent of the relevant age group
•Ratio of girls to boys in primary & percent
secondary education (–)
•Under–ﬁve mortality rate (+) probability per 1,000 newborn babies
a In parentheses: expected sign of coefﬁcient if higher need according to indicator went
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